Sunday, 15 May 2016

Negligence: Damages under Strict Liability [Vohra RajakBhai & Ors v St of Gujarat & Ors (2016)]

Appellants herein had berry trees planted on their land. From a nearby dam constructed and maintained by respondents 60,000 cusecs of water was released which destroyed the plantation. Respondents blame the heavy downpour which resulted in water levels of dam reaching alarming levels due to which water had to be released. Else the rising water level would have breached the dam.  It is the case of appellants that respondents had been negligent and had they controlled the alarming level of water keeping in mind the coming monsoon season no such sudden action was needed.

Thus appellants are claiming damages for loss of crop on account of sheer negligent attitude of respondents. Whereas respondents have raised the defence of ‘act of god’ pleading that heavy rains forced them for sudden heavy release of water.

Evidences before Trial Court and Court of appeal (HC) with their decision

Not much evidences have been lead by parties before the trial court and serious deficiencies have been pointed by SC :
  • Respondents have stored more than retention capacity of water in dam during month of June 1997 knowing fully well that in coming monsoon season water level would increase
  •  TC appointed court commissioners confirmed the loss of appellants through their reports adduced with photographs. They have noted that due to the alleged floods 1500 boar trees were uprooted and submerged in water

Both TC and HC decreed in favor of respondents specifically labeling the loss due to ‘act of god’

“The trial court also found that land of the appellants is situated adjacent to the river bank and, therefore, due to heavy rain, the river could have overflown resulting in entering of  the water into the fields of the appellants in any case. It further held that action of the respondents in releasing the water from dam was a prudent action keeping in view that minimum damage is caused to the public at large because of the heavy rains, which is dependent upon the nature.”
Pointing towards the lack of evidence by appellants in support of their case (as no exact determination of loss, price of produce allegedly destroyed) their prayer was dismissed by trial court.
HC ruled that “it  was a force majeure  circumstance  and,  therefore,  the  appellants  were  not entitled to any compensation.”
Issues before SC

  • Whether the act of releasing the water from the dam would amount to negligence on the part of the respondents or it was inevitable due to heavy rains and is to be treated as an 'act of God'?
  • If the answer to the aforesaid question is in the affirmative, whether the appellants would be entitled to some compensation even in the absence of proof of actual/exact damage caused?

The Case of Strict Liability: Rylands  v Fletcher (1868)

In Rylands v Fletcher the principle is well known:
a) If a person on his land brings and keeps something which is likely to do mischief upon escape, such thing must be kept in peril;
b) And if he does not do so resulting in escape of that thing;
c) The person would be prima facie answerable for damage which is the natural consequence of its escape

Blackburn J further expands his principle by stating: “The person whose grass or corn is eaten down by the escaping cattle of his neighbour, or  whose mine is flooded by  the water  from his neighbour's reservoir, or whose cellar is invaded by the  filth  of  his  neighbour's  privy,  or  whose habitation  is  made  unhealthy  by  the  fumes  and noisome vapours of  his neighbour's alkali  work is damnified  without  any  fault  of  his  own;  and  it seems but reasonable and just that the neighbor who has brought  something on his  own property which was not naturally there, harmless to other so long as it is confined to his own property, but which he  knows  to  be  mischievous  if  it  gets  on  his neighbour's, should be obliged to make good the damage which ensues if  he does not  succeed in confining it to his own property.  But for his act in bringing it  there no mischief  could have accrued, and it  seems but  just  that  he should  at  his  peril keep it  there so that  no mischief  may accrue,  or answer  for  the  natural  and  anticipated consequences.”

Later on in Rickards v Lothian [(1913) AC 263] a clarification was made to above principle that there should be “non-natural use of land” to attract liability under strict liability. Thus “It is not every use to which land is put that brings into play this principle.  It must be some special use bringing  with  it  increased  danger  to  others,  and must not merely be the ordinary use of the land or such a use as is proper for the general  benefit  of the community.”

In Read v J Lyons and Co [(1947) AC 156 (HL)] a further addition was made that there should be ‘escape of thing’ from land of defendant. If no such escape of thing is shown by plaintiff he cannot secure relief under this rule.
Various improvements were made by Indian courts when strict liability principle was applied in national circumstances. Some diluted the above rule of ‘non-natural use of land’ being crucial ingredient to strict liability. One was St of Punjab v Modern Cultivators (AIR 1965 SC 17) where damages were sought for overflowing of water from breach of canal. It was held that construction of canal was natural use of land but this finding did not constrict the court in awarding damages.

In Jay Laxmi Salt Works (Pvt) Ltd v St of Gujarat [(1994) 4 SCC 1]damage was caused by overflow of water from a reclamation bundh constructed by the State of Gujarat for reclamation of vast area of land from saltish water of sea.  In this case, this Court held the Government responsible as the said act was treated as violation of public duty and negligence which lay in defective  planning  and  construction  of  the  bundh.   On  that premise,  damages  were  awarded.
The Court also remarked: “In  a  welfare society construction of dam or bundh for the sake of community is essential function and use of land or accumulation of water for the benefit  of society cannot  be  non-natural  user.  But  that  cannot absolve the State from its duty of being responsible to its citizens for such violations as are actionable and  result  in  damage,  loss  or  injury.  What  is fundamental is injury and not the manner in which it has been caused.

ACT OF GOD
The phrase is well-known exception to principle of strict liability. In words of SC “  Generally, those  acts  which  are occasioned by  the elementary  forces  of nature, unconnected with the agency of man or other cause will come under the category of acts of God……………………What  is  important  here  is  that  it  is  not necessary that it should be unique or that it should happen for the. first  time.It is enough that it is extraordinary and such as could not reasonably be anticipated.”

In S. Vedantacharya  &  Anr.  v.  Highways  Department  of  South Arcot & Ors. [(1987) 3 SCC 400] the situation was “State  Government  erected  a  reservoir  adjoining the plaintiff's land in order to provide drinking water facilities  to  a  village  in  the  State.   The  State acquired a part of the plaintiff's land for the purpose of constructing a channel for carrying the overflow of water from the reservoir to a Nalla which was at a distance of about 1500 feet from the waste-weir of  the reservoir.   This  channel  was however  not constructed except to the extent of 250 feet on the side of  the  Nalla.   Due to very heavy rainfall  the water  from  the  reservoir  overflowed  into  the waste-weir and thereafter flowed over the plaintiff's land, causing considerable damage to the land and the crops standing thereon.
It was held: “It  was held  that  the  fact  that  the  danger  materialized subsequently  by an act  of  God was not  a matter which absolved the State  from its  liability  for  the earlier negligence in that no proper channel for the flow or overflow of water from the waster-weir was constructed by it in time; that the act of the State in constructing the reservoir for the supply of drinking water to its citizens at best could be considered a welfare  act  and  not  an  act  in  its  capacity  as  a sovereign; and that, therefore, the State was liable in negligence for the loss caused to the plaintiff.

Thus what would lead to decide the present factual matrix was whether damage to appellant was due to some inevitable accident or unavoidable accident which could not have been prevented by ordinary care and caution
The respondents have specifically refuted the appellants argument that they failed to take pre monsoon season measures to keep check upon level of water. But this is not supported by any evidence. There is nothing to show that “  that the water  in the dam was kept at reasonable and proper level to take care of normal rains; the rains in the said monsoon season were more than the ordinary rains which could not  be foreseen; and that the public purpose was served in taking the decision to release the water which prevented larger catastrophe.” 

In age of advance meteorological equipment and satellite data where volume of rainfall could be roughly predicted, it was not prudent for respondents to further  unsubstantiated arguments that release of water was forced due to sudden heavy rains. Hence they were held responsible for negligent conduct and loss due to appellants


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